Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International Investment Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint? by Schneiderman, David
  
Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law 
Antigua Universidad s/n - Apdo.28 20560 Oñati - Gipuzkoa – Spain 
Tel. (+34) 943 783064 / Fax.(+34) 943 783147 
E: opo@iisj.es W: http://opo.iisj.net 
1 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 
 
Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International Investment 
Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint?  
  
 
DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN ∗ 
Abstract 
There are at least two views within investment arbitration about how to respond to 
legitimation problems associated with inconsistent rulings, latitudinal 
interpretations, and arbitral bias and conflicts of interest. Some prefer to keep the 
regime on course and not respond to these outside perturbations. Others prefer to 
take into account external influences, such as human rights and environmental 
commitments, in the course of investment treaty interpretation. Both understand 
that, whatever the response, these questions will be determined by lawyers, 
scholars, and arbitrators operating within the system of international investment 
law and not by actors operating outside of it. Both views, in other words, are 
congenial to systems-theoretic accounts. As articulated by Teubner, there is a 
proliferation of functional legal sub-systems, developing autonomously of states, 
each of which, in the course of maximizing internal rationality, potentially is on a 
collision course with other operative sub-systems. These can only be forestalled if 
sub-systems act reflexively by devising strategies of self-limitation that selectively 
internalize objections emanating from external spheres. As this maps on to self-
understandings of actors operating within investment arbitration, this paper takes 
up systems theory as a heuristic for assessing the regime’s responsiveness to 
outside influences. In order to take stock of the degree of reflexivity, the paper 
examines the direction investment law is taking in a few key areas: first, in the 
shift in emphasis away from expropriations (the ‘takings rule’) to the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, which is performing similar functions; second, in the 
attempt to merge global standards by embracing World Trade Organization 
Appellate Body decision making; and third, the hesitant embrace of proportionality 
doctrine as a means of weighing public interests into the equation. These moments 
of reflexivity turn out to be modest in reach and so unlikely to calm objections 
emanating from states and social movements. What likely will be necessary is 
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intervention into and steering by states of the regime, an intervention that is 
anathematic to Teubner’s system-theoretic account. 
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Introduction 
Despite the rapid world-wide proliferation of international investment treaties, 
doubts remain about the sustainability of the international investment arbitration in 
the contemporary world. Inconsistent and conflicting jurisprudence (Schneiderman 
2010a), latitudinarian interpretations (Sornarajah 2008), Northern bias in 
investment arbitration outcomes (Sornarajah 2008b, cf. Franck 2009), arbitral 
conflicts of interest (Van Harten 2007, cf. Park 2010), and doubtful benefits in 
terms of new inward foreign investment (Yackee 2008, cf. UNCTAD 2009a) are 
generating an increasingly vocal critique. A few states even have begun to check 
out. The government of Ecuador, for instance, has withdrawn from the convention 
that grants jurisdiction to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) (ICSID 2009), has denounced eleven bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) that have proven less than fruitful to the Ecuadorian economy (UNCTAD 
2009b, p. 32) and is likely to denounce another thirteen BITs with countries such as 
the U.S. Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Canada (Alvaro 2009). 
Throwing a wrench into investment rules works more generally, the new 
Ecuadorean constitution provides that no jurisdiction will be ceded to international 
arbitration concerning commercial and contractual disputes (Art., p. 422). South 
Africa is reconsidering its bilateral investment treaty framework. South Africa’s 
Department of Trade and Industry observes that the current model of investment 
treaty, borrowed from the United Kingdom, has disserved South Africa’s 
constitutional project of societal reconciliation in the face of stubbornly persistent 
economic inequality (DTI 2009). The ongoing global recession not only emboldens 
critics but generates the conditions for change of unprecedented proportions. 
“Investment arbitration is in crisis,” declares Sornarajah (2008, p. 73). 
Actors operating within the regime of international investment arbitration will, of 
course, have taken note of these developments. They have developed two views 
(though there may be others) about how the regime should respond. Some take 
the view that investment treaties are lex specialis and so confined to 
determinations only of whether investor rights have been violated. Other 
considerations, such as human rights norms unconnected to property rights or 
multilateral environmental commitments cannot weigh in to that equation. This is a 
view we might associate with writers who tend to characterize international 
investment law as a “system” or a “regime” (Douglas 2003, Salacuse 2010). 
Arbitrators, according to this account, simply are giving effect to international 
agreements, whose object and purpose are the promotion and protection of foreign 
investment, irrespective of their consequences for conflicting rationalities (Paulsson 
2005, p. 363). It is not that municipal law or international law does not play a role 
in investment treaty arbitration – they perform certain functions and on occasion fill 
vacuums, to be sure – but resort to these sources of law will be had sporadically. 
The hope, as the late Thomas Wälde put it, is that international investment law will, 
with the “fullness of time . . .  have less recourse to other, external sources of law,” 
though, he admits, international investment law “cannot be completely isolated” 
(2007, p. 118). The commonly-expressed concern about the fragmentation of 
international law (ILC 2006) –discrete specialized regimes each giving expression to 
their own embedded preferences (Koskenniemi 2007, Koskenniemi and Leino 2002) 
– generates little anxiety in this camp.1  
Others are more open to influences entering into international investment treaty 
interpretation from outside of the regime’s particular object and purpose. 
McLachlan, for instance, describes investment treaties not as self-contained 
regimes but as informed by, and in conversation with, “general international law” 
                                                 
1 As the late Thomas Wälde put it, international investment law is a “novel  ‘hybrid/mixed’ form” of 
dispute settlement that, with the “fullness of time will develop its own jurisprudence constante [so as to 
limit tribunal inconsistency], and have less recourse to other, external sources of law,” though, Wälde 
admits, international investment law “cannot be completely isolated” (2007, p. 118). 
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(2008, p. 369).2 The editors of the recent volume entitled The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration (2010), similarly describe the “investment arbitration 
regime” as “in listening mode and ready to adapt” (Waibel et al. 2010, p. xxxix). 
According to this view, international investment arbitration must open itself up to 
outside influences. This will be done, however, on international investment law’s 
own terms using the regime’s own lexicon and logic (i.e. Brower 2003b, Dupuy 
2009, Van Aaken 2006). McLachlan draws on the principle of “systemic integration” 
in treaty interpretation (McLachlan 2005, p. 318)3 as a means of “taking into 
account” (International Law Commission 2006, paras. 415, 419) the broader 
normative environment in which international investment law operates. Having 
resort to this broader normative universe performs a “systemic function . . . linking 
specialized parts to each other and to universal principles” (International Law 
Commission 2006, para. 475). This is a technical device that provides no definitive 
answers to regime collision. Rather, it is a style of management that delegates 
responsibility for acknowledging and accommodating the broader environment to 
legal technicians operating within international law’s discrete domains (Klabbers 
2007, p. 161).4  
I want to suggest that both views share an insistence on structuring encounters 
with the outside normative universe on international investment law’s own terms – 
the terms of their interaction cannot be dictated, in other words, by actors 
operating from outside of the system. On either view, then, it will be international 
investment lawyers, arbitrators, and scholars who will determine the extent to 
which conflicting, non-investment-promoting considerations get let in. States, of 
course, have a role to play to the extent they incorporate such concerns into treaty 
practice. As I suggest below, we should not, however, overstate the capacity of 
states to depart from the expert advice given to them by international investment 
norm-entrepreneurs who have the ear of those having authority over this dossier.   
Both responses, as a descriptive matter, resonate in system-theoretic terms. That 
is, they both comprehend international investment law as a sub-system of rules 
and institutions with its own logic and system of policing interactions with other, 
even competing, sub-systems of law – the hallmarks of legal autopoeisis. Common 
to both camps, then, is an account of international investment law as developing 
autonomously from (though intimately related to) other norm-producing systems 
and that it is potentially on a collision course with other sub-systems of law that are 
organized around logics other than that of promoting foreign investment. This is an 
account congenial to Teubner’s analysis of global law and societal constitutionalism, 
as I argue below. In Teubner’s account, when confronted with the opposing logic of 
a conflicting system, system actors can act reflexively and selectively respond to 
these external “irritations” (Teubner 1986).  In this paper I ask whether 
international investment arbitrators might also be considered to be acting 
reflexively when confronted with systemic conflict – a reflexivity prompted by 
nagging concerns about the ongoing legitimacy of the investment rules regime.   
In the first part of the paper, I review some of the salient features of reflexive law 
through an autopoetic lens as articulated by Teubner, building upon Luhmann’s 
                                                 
2 By general international law, McLachlan is referring to the International Law Commission Report (2006) 
(to which he provided assistance) which admits that, general international, though not well articulated or 
understood, refers to general customary international law as well as “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” and might also refer to “principles of international law proper and to 
analogies from domestic laws” (2006, p. 254). The report also developes the notion of “self-contained 
regimes” (ibid. at paras. 123-37). 
3 McLachlan describes the term as his contribution to the International Law Commission’s (ILC) report on 
fragmentation (International Law Commission 2006). 
4 It should be emphasized that Koskenniemi, chair of the ILC study group on fragmentation, aims to 
politicize international law (“giving voice to those not represented in the regime’s institutions”) and so 
moves away from its penchant for expert rule and managerialism (2007, p. 29). One does not get that 
international law should be moving in a less technical direction from McLachlan’s related contributions 
(see McLachlan 2005; 2008).  
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systems theory (1994, 2004). This is undertaken not as an endorsement of 
autopoesis as an accurate description of the world5 or a normatively desirable end 
point for it. Rather, it is conscripted here as a heuristic for describing the self-
understanding of the relevant actors operating within international investment law’s 
spheres of jurisdiction. In order to take stock of the degree of reflexivity apparent 
in investment arbitration, the second half of the paper examines the direction 
investment law is taking in a few key areas: (1) in the shift in emphasis away from 
expropriations (the ‘takings rule’) to the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
which is performing similar functions; (2) in the attempt to merge global standards 
by embracing World Trade Organization Appellate Body decision making; and (3), 
the hesitant embrace of proportionality doctrine as a means of weighing public 
interests into the equation. There certainly are other features of the investment law 
regime that are undergoing change as a result of these system conflicts (i.e. an 
emphasis on procedural innovations having to do with increasing transparency and 
qualified standing of NGOs at dispute hearings) that could have been the focus for 
discussion.6 I concur with Vagts, however, that “the heart of the backlash relates to 
the substance of BITs” (Vagts 2010, p. xxv) and so a focus on the outputs 
associated with investment treaty arbitration smokes out some of the discrete ways 
that the regime reveals a degree of “reflexive legitimacy” (Banakar 1998). It might, 
admittedly, seem curious to turn to systems-theory as a way of thinking about 
investment arbitration reflexivity.  This is a methodological device, after all, that 
operates at a high degree of generality – subjects, as agents of change, virtually 
drop out of the picture (Frankenberg 1992, p. 20). The approach does capture, 
however, dominant thinking about investment arbitration. By deferring to the self-
conceptions of legal actors and theorizing legal change via orderly internalization 
that minimizes disturbances, (Frankenberg 1992, p. 20), systems theory describes 
well how the system drags its heels but nevertheless is feeling pressure to change. 
Before proceeding with this discussion, permit me to say one last thing about 
legitimacy. In an age when national states increasingly are giving up policy space to 
other institutional actors, legal forms no longer can simply rely on the coercive 
authority of the national state to shore up their legitimacy (Weber 1968, p. 314). 
Whatever legitimacy may have been generated by the initial grant of consent to 
these institutions (i.e. Habermas 2006, p. 81), the claim wears thin as these 
regimes take on constitution-like functions (Schneiderman 2008). For some, 
legitimacy will rest on the reputation and authority of arbitrators (Wälde 2007) or 
on the power of the regime’s normative framework (Brower 2003a). In a time of 
seeming dissensus about the authority of and normative pull of markets, something 
more is needed. In the language of systems theory, to the extent that the regime 
has significant effects beyond the reproductive operation of the system itself then, 
in order to address but not fully resolve legitimacy problems, the regime’s agents 
will increasingly have resort to innovations of various sorts, including some of those 
canvassed below. 
 
1.Reflexive Law  
Taking a neo-evolutionary approach to legal development (Habermas 1979, p. 
141), Teubner closed in on the reflexive element in modern law. This he contrasted 
with formal and substantive rationalities of modern legality. Formal legal rationality 
contributed to individual autonomy and freedom – formalities “facilitate private 
ordering” (1983, p. 252). Substantive rationality shifted modern law’s focus “from 
autonomy to regulation,” observed Teubner (1983, p. 253).  Law takes on a 
purposive orientation as legal functions shift to achieving substantive aims via legal 
methods.  The idea that purpose-driven legislation could emancipate legal subjects, 
                                                 
5 Though, as the ILC notes, it complements well their fragmentation hypothesis (ILC 2006, para. 133). 
6 An emphasis on proceduralization is one of the hallmarks of reflexive law (Wiethölter 1989). 
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associated with the rise of the welfare state, had now been exhausted (Scheuerman 
2001, Calliess and Zumbansen 2010, p. 52). Teubner arrives, then, at his third 
form, reflexive rationality, focusing on law’s coordinating function which “retreats 
from taking full responsibility for substantive outcomes” (1983, p. 254). Instead, 
reflexive law “tends to rely on procedural norms that regulate processes, 
organization, and the distribution of rights and competencies” (1983, p. 255). 
Teubner claimed that reflexive rationality captured contemporary legal processes in 
the face of claims that the welfare state was in crisis (Habermas 1987, p. 364).7  
Taking up Luhmann’s systems-theoretic approach, 8 Teubner diagnosed the 
capacity of reflexive structures to learn and adapt and to “resolve conflicts between 
function and performance by imposing internal restrictions on given sub-systems so 
that they are suitable as components of the environment of other subsystems” 
(Teubner 1983, p. 273).9 Though sub-systems are “normatively closed,” they 
respond to their environment by being “cognitively open” (Luhmann 2004, p. 106). 
Autopoietic systems – sub-systems operating within the larger social system – self-
reproduce with reference to their own operating elements (or media of 
communication) rather than those of other competing sub-systems (Teubner 1988, 
p. 3, Luhmann 2004, p. 80-81). Despite this boundary policing, they are, 
nevertheless, open to communications from other sub-systems. These 
“perturbations” are capable of being internalized according to the language of the 
irritated sub-system. This is in contrast to the “structural coupling” between law 
and politics, for instance, which has the effect of channelling influences between 
these two sub-systems on an ongoing basis (Luhmann 2004, p. 382). It is this 
openness – a new “self-restraint”– that Teubner appears to emphasize in this early 
diagnosis. Reflexive law is sensitive to “outside effects” in the course of maximizing 
internal rationality and so has the ability to identify opportunities to self-correct 
without “irreversibly destroying valued patterns of social life” (1983, p. 274, 278).  
                                                
As did Luhmann, Teubner underscored the futility of attempting to unify different 
operative social systems. “Centralized social integration is effectively ruled out 
today,” he observed (1983, p. 272) – abandoning any concern with the 
contemporary fragmentation of international law (Koskenniemi and Leino 2002). 
This legal pluralist orientation has been helpful in thinking about the proliferation of 
global legal orders in the post-Cold War era. (Berman 2007). For instance, drawing 
on the transnational commercial law of lex mercatoria, customary law developed by 
commercial arbitration and practice, Teubner theorized the provocative claim that a 
“global law” was developing in “relative insulation” from (or “without”) the state 
(Teubner 1997, p. 3). This was because the “structural coupling” between law and 
politics under the supervision of national constitutional orders now “had no 
correspondence on the level of world society” (Teubner 1997, 6 quoting Luhmann 
2004, p. 487-88). Condemning the narrowness of “methodological nationalism” 
(Beck 2005, p. 22), legal norm production (defined by the binary legal/illegal) could 
now be observed proliferating outside of common national institutions. These 
observations precipitated Teubner’s later formulation regarding “societal 
constitutionalism,” which describes the emergence of autonomous legal orders 
proliferating at the global level. International organizations, trade unions, NGOs and 
multinational corporations are all authors in the construction of societal 
 
7 “The more the welfare state goes beyond pacifying class conflict lodged in the private sphere of 
production and spreads a net of client relationships over private spheres of life, the stronger are the 
anticipated pathological side effects of a juridification that entails both a bureaucratization and a 
monetarization of core areas of lifeworld” (Habermas 1987, p. 364). 
8  In his work on legal autopoesis, Teubner took up the innovative project of conjoining legal theory with 
Luhmann’s systems theoretical approach (a subject which Luhmann had himself addressed). It is not my 
object to trace Teubner’s intellectual trajectory here. Instead, it might be helpful to draw on more recent 
work for the purpose of highlighting some continuities of thought that will have relevance to the 
discussion that follows. 
9 The imposition here, presumably, is self-authored by the system upon itself and imposed via its own 
media of communication. 
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constitutions – a constitutionalization of separate global sub-systems “without the 
state” (2004, p. 8, 15).  
These sectoral constitutions have been developing for a long time (2010a, p. 4) “in 
underground evolutionary processes” (2004, p. 18). They are now beginning to 
have a presence, though “invisible to the naked eye” (ibid.) on a global scale 
because of the increasing complexity and functional differentiation of society on 
multiple scales (2010a, p. 4). The constitutive rules developed autonomously by 
these various societal actors are increasingly, however, coming into conflict. In 
language reminiscent of Polanyi’s double movement (Polanyi 1944, p. 138-39),10 
Teubner describes “counter-movements . . . now appearing which form limitative 
rules, in order to countervail self-destructive tendencies and to limit damage to 
social, human and natural environments” (2010a, p. 6). “It is only a matter of 
time,” writes Teubner, before liberated energies of an autopoeitic systems “have 
destructive consequences of such proportions, that the resulting societal conflicts 
push for drastic change of constitutional politics” (2010a, p. 19). The task today, 
then, is to “identify the real structures of the existing global constitutionalism, to 
criticise its shortcomings and to formulate realistic proposals for limitative rules” 
(Teubner 2010a, p. 6). This is a strategy of devising “internal limitations” to sub-
systems, inhibiting their compulsion to growth (Teubner 2010b). They can then 
suitably correspond, and will not do damage to, their social environments (Teubner 
1983, p. 273). It is worth pausing to underscore here that Teubner’s prescriptive 
account does not include doing away with any of these fragments of 
constitutionalism, rather, the impulse is reformative: it is not about building up 
something new, but “transform[ing] what is an already existing constitutional 
order” (2010a, p. 6, cf. Frankenberg 1992). 
 
2.Reflexive Investment Law? 
Having described, some of the key elements of reflexive law, we are now in a 
position to assess how well Teubner’s analysis fits with self-conceptions of the 
actors in international investment law. We might say, firstly, that the dominant 
content of investment rules exhibit elements of formal, and not reflexive, law. The 
regime is intended, after all, to provide stable legal environments to facilitate the 
movement of capital across national boundaries (CMS 2005, para. 274). The extent 
to which international investment law can be characterized as reflexive, therefore, 
will depend on the degree to which investment arbitration contributes, as a sensory 
device, to learning processes by which investment rules will evolve. It is doubtful 
that it can be said that investment arbitration has embraced reflexivity by 
retreating from taking “full responsibility for substantive outcomes” and focussing 
instead on more open-ended outcomes (Teubner 1983, p. 254).11 It might be more 
accurate to say that, rather than having reached the “highest” stage of legal 
rationality, the regime concurrently exhibits features of all three dominant legal 
rationalities Teubner identified in 1983.12  
Secondly, it can be said that many of the actors operating within international 
investment law view the regime as an autonomous, norm-producing sub-system 
that is focussed principally on its own self-production and so, in this way, is 
“normatively closed” but “cognitively open” (Luhmann 2004, p. 106). The extent to 
which actors view the system a referring principally to its own norms and logic as 
developed via treaty text and arbitral jurisprudence, rather than relying on outside 
                                                 
10 Teubner subsequently acknowledged this connection to Polanyi (2010b, text associated with fn. 51).  
11 Yet it also is the case, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner observe, that “global private regimes” increasingly 
are creating their own substantive law (2004, p. 1010). 
12 It probably is fair to assume that this will be the case for many of the sub-systems of law that 
autopoesis theorists would want to take up for discussion. 
David Schneiderman   Legitimacy and Reflexivity 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 9 
sources of law (Wälde 2007, p. 118), then the regime exhibits, form this point of 
view, some of the classical features of a social sub-system. This is not to say that 
the regime will be closed to external influences (the “backlash” problem identified 
above suggests otherwise), only that in so far as it is responsive to its own 
shortcomings those responses will be determined by the regime’s own principal 
players (lawyers, arbitrators, academics). These actors will respond in accordance 
with the regime’s own embedded preferences employing the regime’s own 
terminology and typically not according to the logic of competing sub-systems, such 
as international environmental or human rights law.  
It could not be said, thirdly, that the regime is uncoupled from the state and 
politics. We should qualify the immediately preceding paragraph by saying that 
states that are party to investment treaties, generating the constitutional 
architecture for the regime’s operations, shape the sub-system’s operations by 
negotiating specific treaty text and by modifying those texts or, as in the case of 
NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission (FTC) (an interstate cabinet level body), issuing 
interpretive directives (Roberts 2010). Even here, however, state influence in the 
ongoing operations of the system is limited. Though investment treaties exhibit 
some variance, and despite their vaunted flexibility (Schneiderman 2009), there 
remain a standard set of core constraints that most every investment treaty will 
exhibit. Nor have interpretive notes, such as those issuing out of the NAFTA FTC, 
proven entirely effective in taming the exercise of arbitral discretion. Indeed, in the 
case of an interpretive note intended to narrow the scope of the minimum standard 
of treatment requirement to that provided under customary international law, 
NAFTA tribunals have been resistant to being so confined (Pope & Talbot 2002, 
para. 59, Mondev 2002, para. 124, Schneiderman 2008, p. 81-82).13 As this 
discussion suggests, then, it cannot be said that the investment rules regime is a 
species of global law without the state. States are deeply implicated in the 
construction of the regime – with over 2,700 BITs signed, they are its principal 
architects and authors – and to the extent that they continue to tolerate incursions 
into policy domains previously unchecked by international institutions, are key to 
sustaining the regime’s operations. Rather than being a species of pristine non-
national law, the regime’s rules are generated in specific locales and intended to 
replicate specific national experiences (Schneiderman 2008, p. 44-45). They, 
consequently, are a prime example of what Santos calls “globalized localism” 
(Santos 2002, p. 179) – local rules that have had global lift-off. Even Teubner’s 
claims about the autonomy of lex mercatoria, the system of international 
commercial law and arbitration that has served as a device for measuring the 
existence of global law,14 seem extravagant. There is no question, for instance, that 
lex mercatoria has had a “productive relationship with national contracts law” 
(Calliess and Zumbansen 2010, p. 32, 59), that state authority authorizes its 
enforcement (Cutler 2003, p. 237), and that the shape it takes will be determined 
partly by the response of national states (Zumbansen 2002, p.  402, Dezalay and 
Garth 1996).15 
We might acknowledge, fourthly, that the investment rules regime, as self-
understood by its relevant actors, generates a version of societal constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism is a plastic term and serves sometimes conflicting purposes in the 
contemporary literature on global law. For Teubner, it would appear that 
constitutionalism, at a minimum, refers principally to the capacity of autonomous 
                                                 
13 And so interpreting the requirement as “evolving” to include a standard of “fairness” which the Note 
was intended to foreclose. 
14 Caliess and Zumbansen describe lex mercatoria, for this reason, as a “methodological problem” and so 
a device for reflecting “on the nature and possibility of transnational law” (2010, p. 31, 33). 
15 Stone Sweet describes the system as “parasitic” on state authority, using state authority “where 
necessary, essentially for enforcement purposes, while otherwise working to reduce the reach of 
sovereign control over transnational business” (2006, p. 627). He appears to lose sight of the myriad 
ways in which states prove to be important allies in the sturcturation of transnational business law (see 
Dezalay and Garth 1996). 
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groups to organize themselves into self-functioning associations, in much the same 
way as the British political pluralists described political life in the early part of the 
twentieth century (Hirst 1989). For instance, Teubner describes the “constitutional 
emancipation” of the WTO (2010a, p. 15), which suggests a deepening of the 
constitutional account generated by John Jackson (1997).  Teubner now speaks of 
systems that not only engage in norm production but that also exhibit certain 
“constitutional properties” (Teubner cites Peters 2006, p. 585, see also Cass 2005, 
p. 19, Walker 2002, p. 343). There are limits to the constitutional analogy, Teubner 
admits, however. They are confined to specific domains of international law and so 
have no correspondence to achieving the constitutional effects of national states, in 
performing a redistributive function, for instance. They have no capacity to 
“constitutionalis[e] other global spheres” (Teubner 2010a, p. 13)16 and instead are 
characterized as “islands of constitutionality” (Teubner 2010a, p. 14). There are 
only “occasional couplings [rather than structural couplings] as and when social 
problems demand” (ibid.). 
Yet, the investment rules regime, in contrast, has significant effects beyond the 
reproductive operation of the system itself. Work I have done elsewhere on the 
constitution-like features of the investment rules regime suggests that it exhibits 
features I associate with a constraining model of constitutionalism (Schneiderman 
2008, p. 37). This is a classical model of constitutionalism distrustful of exercises of 
power by public (but not private) authorities (McIlwain 1947, p. 21) and in which, 
more specifically, the state is expected to recede from regulation and redistribution 
(Hayek 1982). It is this diminished version of constitutionalism that has been 
described as emerging at the transnational level in the form of a “new 
constitutionalism.” New constitutionalist proposals, writes Gill, are “intended to ‘lock 
in’ commitments to liberal forms of development, frameworks of accumulation and 
of dispossession so that global governance is premised on the primacy of the world 
market” (Gill 2008, p. 254). It is noteworthy that this constraining version of 
constitutionalism bears little resemblance to reflexive legal rationality that Teubner 
associates with global law without the state. Rather, it reflects the legal rationality 
of individualism which Teubner associates with the formal aspects of law.  
If it is correct to claim that the self-understanding of relevant actors operating in 
investment law’s domains correspond well to a system-theoretic account, we should 
then also ask if the regime exhibits any signs of reflexivity. Does it respond well to 
the perturbations introduced by competing social sub-systems? Have the liberated 
energies of the investment rules regime led to “self-destructive tendencies” such 
that ensuing societal conflicts are resulting in the introduction of new limitative 
constitutional norms within the regime itself, as Teubner recommends (2010a, p. 
6)? I want to suggest, in the next part of the paper, that what can be described as 
modest evidence of reflexivity can be mapped out. There is some learning and 
adapting to systemic collisions – the movement to embrace proportionality, for 
instance, is emblematic of this move toward reflexive legitimacy – but overall the 
regime’s sensors are rather faulty. Employing this legal autopoietic frame 
underscores that, in so far as the investment rules regime is limited to initiatives 
that result only in the system’s self-reproduction exclusively on its own terms – 
self-limitation strategies can only succeed, Teubner writes, “within, and not 
outwith, the logic specific to a subsystem” (2010a, p. 21) – then inter-societal 
collisions are not likely to result in transformative change. The question then 
becomes whether the regime nevertheless remains sustainable going forward. I 
turn, in the next part, to a consideration of the ways in which the investment rules 
regime might be considered responsive to its social environment. 
 
                                                 
16 Teubner makes a similar observation about the limits of global administrative law (GAL). It is 
“concerned with the internal constitutions of the regulatory agencies; they cannot function as 
constitutional norms in the regulated spheres” (2010, p. 13). 
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3.Regime Openness 
In order to measure system responsiveness, I look below for innovations developed 
by arbitration tribunals. These, it might be said, have been encouraged or 
prompted by critiques issuing out of states and social movements regarding the 
system’s deleterious effects on state capacity and social and environmental 
degradation. I examine, (i) the shift in emphasis away from expropriations (the 
‘takings rule’) to the fair and equitable treatment standard, which is performing 
similar functions; (ii) the attempt to merge global standards by embracing World 
Trade Organization Appellate Body decision making; and (iii) the hesitant embrace 
of proportionality doctrine as a means of weighing public interests into the 
equation. In the course of this discussion I make some modest empirical 
observations drawing on the Oxford International Investment Claims database 
comprised of all reported investment tribunal decisions, as of 1994.17 
 
3.1.Shifting Grounds 
Taking the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as our point of 
departure, it is fair to say that, though many elements of the regime prompted 
cautious concern or criticism, there was an overriding anxiety focussed on the 
clause prohibiting expropriation and nationalization, direct or indirect, or measures 
tantamount thereto (the “takings clause”) (Banks 1999, Been and Beauvais 2003, 
Dumberry 2001, Robinson 1993, Schneiderman 1996, Wagner 1999). This made 
some sense as the prohibition most resembled the takings rule in U.S. 
constitutional law, which had been described as a “mess” and “conceptual morass” 
(Dana and Merrill 2002, p. 163-64, Poirier 2002, p. 138, Sax 1964, p. 46). 
Analogizing the takings clause to its constitutional progenitor transformed the 
regime into a transnational constitutional code for the protection of property. This 
made it an easy target for social movement and academic critique, though these 
dangers were resisted by others (see e.g. Soloway 1999, Wilson 2000). Though it 
can be said that tribunal interpretation has evinced latitudinarian tendencies 
(Sornarajah 2008, p. 68-73),18 numbers of arbitrators have been reluctant to find 
takings to have occurred (Newcombe and Paradell 2009, p. 346, Reinisch 2008, p. 
451, e.g. Methanex 2005).  
We might surmise, then, that arbitrators have been cautious in their approach to 
the takings clause in the face of legitimacy concerns about its overbreadth and 
potential ability to frustrate socially desirable legislation. The separate opinion [SO] 
of Bryan Schwartz in S.D. Myers suggests that this is no mere intuition.19 There, 
Schwartz admitted that the imprecise nature of NAFTA’s takings rule had 
precipitated vocal opposition to NAFTA and associated fears and anxieties about the 
decline of state sovereignty and democratic accountability. Acknowledging that, on 
the facts, Canada’s conduct may have amounted to the expropriation of the 
claimant’s goodwill (S.D. Myers [SO] 2001, para. 218) – it may have qualified as a 
“severe deprivation, upsetting an owner’s reasonable expectations” (S.D. Myers 
                                                 
17 Oxford Investment Claims can be found at http://www.investmentclaims.com. The site provides full 
text of awards and decisions to non-subscribers in a PDF format. The year 1994 is taken up as the 
starting date for searchesas it is the date on which the North American Free Trade Agreement entered 
into force and the point in time at which investment arbitration appeared to take off. 
18 As when the Metalclad tribunal (2001) labelled as compensable takings “covert or incidental 
interference which deprive owners, “in whole or significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be expected 
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State” (Metalclad 
2001: para. 103), going well beyond even U.S. takings doctrine (Been and Beauvias 2002). Paulsson 
and Douglas provide an alternative, and unconvincing, reading of the Metalclad  in which a subsequent 
determination would have been made by the tribunal of whether the taking required compensation under 
NAFTA (2004, p. 149).  
19 The dispute concerned a successful challenge to the Government of Canada’s ban on the export, for 
16 months, of PCBs to the U.S. For detailed discussion, see Schneiderman (2008, p. 86-92) on which 
this paragraph draws. 
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[SO] 2001, paras. 212, 213) – Schwartz declined to find a breach of NAFTA’s 
investment chapter. The removal of economic rights was not “lasting” but 
temporary, nor was there a clear transfer of wealth from S.D. Myers to the 
government or to Canadian competitors (S.D. Myers [SO] 2001, paras. 220, 221). 
A finding of expropriation, on the other hand, “might contribute to public 
misunderstanding and anxiety” about the decision and the wider implications of 
NAFTA (S.D. Myers [SO] 2001, para. 222). Recognizing that the breadth of the 
takings rule has “resulted in real anxiety on the part of academic critics” (S.D. 
Myers [SO] 2001, para. 202, citing Wagner 1999) and directing his opinion not only 
to the parties but “to the wider public” (S.D. Myers [SO] 2001, para. 34), Schwartz 
preferred to decline to exercise this jurisdiction. Moreover, it would make no 
practical difference if the action were labelled an expropriation as damages likely 
would be the same if the tribunal found for the claimant on other grounds, namely, 
national treatment or fair and equitable treatment.20  
Tribunals have not merely declined to find regulatory takings, however. As the S.D. 
Myers tribunal suggests, other treaty provisions have emerged to serve as 
functional equivalents. Dolzer has suggested that fair and equitable treatment “is in 
its substance closely related to the more specific standards of an indirect 
expropriation” (2005, p. 87, Dolzer and Schreuer 2008, p. 104). The Waste 
Management tribunal (2004) observed that fair and equitable treatment has been 
invoked repeatedly “alongside” claims that there has been an expropriation, as an 
“alternative and overlapping” basis for compensation (Waste Management 2004, 
para. 86).21 This is not to suggest that all denials of fair and equitable treatment 
can be considered equivalent to regulatory takings, only that the fair and equitable 
treatment rule is performing some of the functions served by a regulatory takings 
rule. This is particularly the case in so far as both grounds are attentive to 
compensating for failed investment-backed expectations (Fietta 2006). In CMS, for 
instance, the tribunal found that the Government of Argentina’s policy reversal 
(abandoning conversion of both utility rates from pesos to US dollars and semi-
annual adjustments in accordance with the US Producer Price Index) in response to 
the country’s economic meltdown in 2001 amounted to a denial of fair and 
equitable treatment. The tribunal treated the license under which the public utility 
operated, together with its operative legal framework, as if they guaranteed a rate 
of return on its investment that was unjustifiably denied to the company (CMS 
2005, p. 161). This, Schill rightly observes, amounts to treating CMS’ investment as 
if it were in the nature of a property right (2006, p. 7).  
The likelihood of overlap makes sense in light of the regulatory takings doctrine 
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central (1978). U.S. courts are 
directed to consider a number of factors: whether the diminution in value is 
attributable to the government conduct, the character of the government action, 
and the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct (later modified to 
reasonable) investment-back expectations (1978, p. 124-25). The last of these 
three appears to have been drawn from the agenda-setting paper by Michelman 
(1967). In describing how courts do the work of determining when government 
action merits just compensation under the takings rule (1967, p. 1250), Michelman 
concluded that the question to be asked is “whether or not the measure in question 
can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly 
perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation” (1967, p. 1233). 
The requirement of compensation, Michelman argued, was premised on the 
assumption that property consisted of “several discrete ‘things’” (the classical 
understanding of property-as-a-bundle-of-rights) (Singer 2000, p. 9-13) and that 
deprivation of one of these things was “attended by a pain of a specially acute or 
demoralizing kind” (1967, p. 1234). Retroactive changes, then, were more likely to 
                                                 
20  Two of three tribunal members found a breach of fair and equitable treatment (S..D. Myers 2001, 
para. 266, following Mann 1981, p. 243-44). 
21 As suggested in Newcombe and Paradell (2009, p. 351). 
David Schneiderman   Legitimacy and Reflexivity 
 
raise demoralization costs worthy of some compensation. The legitimate 
expectations branch of the standard of fair and equitable treatment appears to be 
standing in for the sort of constitutional discipline that would have been served by a 
robust regulatory takings rule.  
Fietta wonders whether tribunals will prefer (as did the S.D. Myers tribunal) to find 
breaches of the fair and equitable treatment in these circumstances over the “more 
fundamental and demanding expropriation standard” (2006, p. 385). One tribunal 
suggests this precisely should be the case. The Sempra tribunal found a denial of 
fair and equitable treatment, as did CMS on identical facts, and acknowledged that:  
 
on occasion the line separating the breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard from an indirect expropriation can be very thin … In case of doubt, 
however, judicial prudence and deference to State functions are better served by 
opting for a determination in the light of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
This also explains why the compensation granted to redress the wrong done might 
not be too different on either side of the line (Sempra 2007, para. 301).  
 
The tribunal’s reasons are somewhat opaque. They suggest that fair and equitable 
treatment is to be preferred because it is more “deferential” to state functions and 
so, perhaps, will be viewed by states as less stinging a rebuke. The available data 
suggests that this may indeed be the preferred course of action for tribunals. Figure 
#1 reveals that, where both grounds are available to tribunals, arbitrators have 
increasingly preferred to find a denial of fair and equitable treatment rather than an 
expropriation. Figure #2 suggests that, of fair and equitable treatment claims 
preferred in Figure #1, many will concern the legitimate expectations doctrine (the 
corresponding element that is commonly a part of determining whether a 
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Whatever the case, Sempra underscores that the fair and equitable treatment is 
serving similar functions as the ground of expropriation, but without having to meet 
the more substantial and lasting deprivation typically associated with a 
compensable taking (Pope & Talbot 2000, paras. 100-102). Does this shifting 
terrain, moving complaints from the takings clause to another investment treaty 
discipline, exhibit some of the features of reflexive law? Though it does not seem an 
entirely effective strategy – critics simply will relocate the basis for their objections 
– it does help to make less transparent the substance of what is going on under the 
cover of investment treaty arbitration, at least in the short term. Moreover, it might 
prove less objectionable to ground this sort of claim in an evolving and omnibus 
international law standard, which includes a variety other attributes in addition to 
reasonable investment-backed expectations (Mondev 2002, p. 123).   
 
3.2. The WTO System 
Yet another measure of responsiveness is an investment tribunal’s cognitive 
openness to related regimes. International investment law prefers to self-identify as 
a sub-species of public international law, representing the codification of customary 
international law (Wälde and Kolo 2001, p. 846). In which case, one will find, not 
surprisingly, references to influential International Court of Justice rulings and to 
the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (McLachlan 2008, p. 
395-98)22 More instructive, perhaps, will be references to interpretations of the 
Uruguay-round GATT by WTO panels and appellate boards. This regime of 
international trade law has been emerging alongside the rise of the international 
investment regime and increasingly tribunals are having recourse to its evolving 
jurisprudence. There has been a discernible upward trend in tribunal references to 
WTO case law. Of 26 awards that make reference to the WTO, a significant majority 
of 18 (almost 70 per cent) cite WTO cases with some measure of approval. There 
also has been a significant uptake of approving WTO references in recent years, 
suggesting a measure of consensus about the utility of resorting to this sort of 
persuasive precedent (see Figure #3). 
                                                 
22 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(c). 








Typically, these references to WTO case law will be in support of procedural 
matters, regarding the national treatment standard or, as in the recent case of 
Continental Casualty (2008) discussed next, with reference to the availability of 
exceptions (Newcombe and Paradell 2008, p. 170-74, 495-506). Kurtz describes 
investment tribunal reference to WTO national treatment as “inconsisten[t],” 
“incoherent[t],” and amounting to a “misreading” (2009, p. 750). He attributes this 
“misuse” as “the controlling factor” that explains “critical inconsistencies in the legal 
tests” applied by tribunals in the consideration of national treatment (Kurtz 2009, 
p. 251).  Though early tribunal decisions (Pope & Talbot 2001, S.D. Myers 2001) 
engaged in comparison “reasonably well,” he describes more recent engagements 
(Occidental 2004, Methanex 2005) as “selective” and “misleading” (Kurtz 2009, p. 
763-64). This misreading is attributed to a lack of expertise on the part of 
investment arbitrators, an absence that can be remedied through learning (2009, p. 
770). “This functional and institutional separation is no longer feasible or desirable,” 
Kurtz observes (also Dolzer and Schreuer 2008, p. 185). It might also have the 
benefit of forestalling “deeper forms of backlash” (Kurtz 2009, p. 770-71). Recent 
tribunal appointments – Kurtz singles out the appointment of former WTO Appellate 
Board member Professor Giorgio Sacerdoti to preside over the Continental Casualty 
dispute – can result in a “careful and sophisticated use of WTO exceptions 
jurisprudence,” he maintains (2009, p. 771). By contrast, a comment in the Yale 
Law Journal described the Continental Casualty tribunal’s approving reference to 
WTO jurisprudence in hyperbolic terms:  as having “pervert[ed]” the doctrine and 
“watered down” protections for investors; an “alarming” and “dangerous precedent” 
which “muddle[d] the doctrine and will have costly ramifications” (Claussen 2009, 
p. 1546, 1548, 1555).   
 Let me briefly discuss Continental Casualty (2008) before returning to this 
debate. Three earlier tribunals (including CMS) had similarly struggled with the 
question of whether Argentina could take advantage of the treaty exception or 
customary defence of necessity. Only the LG&E (2006) tribunal had found the 
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necessity defence available (Schneiderman 2010a).23 Continental Casualty joined 
issue with these earlier decisions by learning from the WTO experience. Applying a 
more relaxed standard of review, the tribunal granted a “significant margin of 
appreciation” to Argentina in determining whether a state of necessity prevailed 
(2008, para. 181).24 The WTO/GATT jurisprudence suggested availability of the 
defence of necessity where another measure was not reasonably available (2008, 
para. 195). This was the case here, as the emergency measures were “inevitable, 
or unavoidable, in part indispensable” and undoubtedly had a “genuine relationship” 
between ends and means (2008, para. 197). 
Returning to the debate over recourse to WTO jurisprudence in investment tribunal 
decision making, what is revealing about the arguments are their operative 
presuppositions that resonate in systemic terms. Claussen’s student comment 
understands the two systems as distinct: one is principally “member-driven,” the 
other about protecting investors in specific contexts.25 Each has “developed the 
exercise of judicial activity such that each is specific to its environment” (Claussen 
2009, p. 1553). Kurtz, on the other hand, understands that there is an environment 
existing beyond the borders of each system, in which case, “much can be learned 
within both systems” (2009, p. 770). Though overly hyperbolic, the student 
comment is instructive in the degree to which its author exhibits dominant 
understandings about the regime that are undergoing change, as Kurtz urges, and 
which may help to sustain its legitimacy. Tribunals, as Kurtz would have it, are 
being more open and responsive to perturbations emerging from outside of the 
system and responding by having resort to a regime that appears to lend a hand of 
legitimacy. 
It is worth underscoring that having resort to the WTO system is to seek out 
reinforcements entirely in sync with the project of spreading economic liberalism 
world wide. Having recourse to world trading regime precedent is to look for a 
reliable and steady ally whose internal rationality differs little from the investment 
rules regime. It also is worth noting that it is a little ironic to consider the 
investment regime looking to the WTO system to enhance its legitimacy. After all, 
the WTO has been undergoing its own legitimacy crisis. The cure, for some, has 
been to claim WTO functions rise to the level of a supra- or global constitutional 
order (McGinnis and Movsevian 2000, Petersmann 1996-97). If the WTO were 
likened to national constitutional orders this could have the effect of securing the 
WTO’s legitimacy well into the future – it would become “irreversible, irresistible 
and comprehensive” (Howse and Nicolaïdis 2001, p. 228). Others argue that 
conceiving of the WTO as constitutionalized is a counterproductive response to the 
WTO’s legitimacy crisis. Though not opposed to “constitutionalism in the long run,” 
Howse and Nicolaïdis argue that, rather than raising WTO dispute settlement to a 
‘higher law’ that is above the fray, what is needed is more politics, namely, greater 
democratic accountability, not less (2001, p. 228-229, 248, Dunoff 2006). It could 
be said, however, that the WTO system has to date weathered its legitimacy storm 
better than has the investment rules regime (Cottier 2008).26 The system, though 
hampered by the continuing oversight of national states (Gallagher, Low and Stoler 
2005), continues arguably to grow in strength (China having joined its ranks) and 
does not appear to suffer, at least on the surface, from the threat of various state 
parties checking out of the world trading system. Even if I have overstated the 
                                                 
23  With a member of the LG&E tribunal (Van den Berg) joining a subsequent tribunal that concluded 
otherwise (Enron 2007) giving rise to concerns about inconsistent and irreconcilable rulings on identical 
facts (see discussion in Schneiderman 2010a). 
24 This was “a time of grave crisis is not the time for nice judgments, particularly when examined by 
others with the disadvantage of hindsight” (2008, para. 181). 
25 Claussen denies however that investor protections should be understood in regime terms: “Attention 
given to any concept of an investment regime is secondary,” she writes (Claussen 2009, p. 1553). 
26 Though not in every respect: the TRIPs agreement has come in for stinging rebuke for preferring 
developed country interests over developing ones (Correa 2000) and for potentially impairing access to 
life-saving drugs (Correa 2006). 
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degree to which the WTO has successfully weathered these storms, international 
investment lawyers appear to believe there is some benefit to be gained by hitching 
the investment horse to the world trading system post. 
3.3.Proportionality 
Though sporadic, arbitrators increasingly are resorting to standards associated with 
the work of national and regional high courts around the world, namely, 
proportionality. This standard of review typically, with its focus on ends-means 
analysis (Barak 2006, p. 255),27 is singled out as evidence of an emerging world-
wide consensus in constitutional matters (Beatty 2004, Kumm 2009, Stone Sweet 
and Matthews 2008). It serves as a reliable device by which judges can balance 
competing interests while remaining faithful to the hierarchy of norms represented 
by constitutional rights. Exacting a seemingly neutral, almost mathematical, point 
of view from judicial decision makers (Barak 2007, p. 374-76)28, proportionality 
review has proven to be a wildly popular means of sustaining, if not enhancing, 
judicial legitimacy in an age in which rights conflicts, based on the fact of 
reasonable pluralism typically give rise to intractable disputes without soluble 
resolution (Rawls 1993, p. xvi). In which case, we are living not only in an age of 
rights but “in an era of proportionality,” proclaims former Supreme Court of Israel 
President, Aharon Barak (2010, p. 14). It is little wonder, then, that it also is being 
taken up and, on occasion, embraced by investment tribunals (Krommendijk and 
Morijn 2009, Newcombe and Paradell 2008, p. 363-365).29 By our count, there has 
been increasing reference to proportionality in submissions made by the parties and 
some openness to applying these considerations in the context of resolving 
investment disputes. A total of 23 decisions were returned where proportionality 
was mentioned expressly or impliedly in tribunal decisions. Of these, in only 13 
decisions did tribunals approvingly invoke proportionality analysis in discussing the 
law and, among these, only 8 tribunals actually applied some semblance of a 
proportionality analysis. As Figure #4 reveals, there is a sharpe increase in 













                                                 
27 Proportionality analysis is structured to consider objective, rationality, necessity, and proportionality in 
the narrow sense. Suffice it to say that ends-means analysis, part of the last two inquiries, is the 
dominant part of the analysis. 
28 Justice Barak here discusses the Beit Sourik case where the Israeli High Court of Justice found that the 
route of the planned fence dividing Israel and the West Bank was not proportional based on the last 
branch of the proportionality inquiry. 
29 Typically, these will arise in respect of expropriation claims (Temed 2003, para. 122), denials of 
national treatment (GAMI 2004, para. 114), and fair and equitable treatment (Saluka). 
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The Tecmed case is oft-cited as important precedent in this regard. The Tecmed 
tribunal found there to have been a compensable taking of a Spanish investor’s 
hazardous waste site by reason of the Mexican federal government denying renewal 
of the permit to operate the site. Though the license had been renewed annually in 
the previous two years (it had previously been a license of infinite duration), the 
government denied the third application. The government relied, in part, on 
numerous transgressions of environmental standards by the company and, 
obliquely, Mexican federal law requiring that hazardous waste dumps be located at 
least 25 kilometres distance from any municipality, under which the Tecmed site 
was exempt (Orellana 2007, p. 775). The operation of the site, which was about 13 
kilometres from state of Sonora’s capital, Hermosillo, had prompted a great deal of 
citizen movement opposition. Nevertheless, the government’s actions, the tribunal 
ruled, “fully and irrevocable destroyed” the investment and so amounted to an 
expropriation (Tecmed 2003, para. 117). Not content with examining only the 
effects of a measure on the investor (what has been called “sole-effects” doctrine) 
(Dolzer 2002, p. 79), the tribunal sought to determine whether the measure was 
proportional in its effects in light of the government’s objective.30 The question, as 
framed by the tribunal, was “whether such measures are reasonable with respect to 
their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of 
those who suffered such deprivation. There must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and 
the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure [sic]” (Tecmed 2003, 
para. 122).31 Tipping the scales decidedly against the state in the application of this 
                                                 
30 The tribunal purported to be following the direction of the European Court of Human Rights in James 
(1986). 
31 Though having already found the measure to be a taking, the analysis began with the “due deference” 
that is owed to the state when it takes measures in the public interest (Tecmed 2003, para. 122). 
Among the factors to be considered in assessing proportionality, the tribunal added, was the “size of the 
ownership deprivation” and whether compensation was offered (ibid.). Also weighing into the 
proportionality analysis, added the tribunal, is “that the foreign investor has a reduced or nil 
participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because investors are not entitle[d] to 
exercise political rights reserved to the nationals of the state, such as voting for the authorities that will 
issue the decisions that affect such investors” (ibid.). 
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proportionality test (Schneiderman 2010b, p. 918-19), the tribunal ruled that state 
failed to satisfy this burden of proof. Though there were minor regulatory 
transgressions and other public health concerns, the tribunal concluded, these were 
not the real reason for the failure to renew. Rather, there were “socio-political” 
reasons having to do with the proximity of the site to the local municipality 
(Tecmed 2003, para. 148). Despite the intensity of the local opposition, it was not 
“in any way massive or went any further than the positions assumed by some 
individuals or the members of some groups that were opposed to the landfill” 
(Tecmed 2003, para. 144). Some surmise that had the situation been more 
intense, proportionality analysis might have given way to a different result 
(Krommendijk and Morijn 2009, p. 439). But given the manner in which the 
tribunal rather strictly applied proportionality doctrine – by having “sole effects” 
doctrine play a predominant role within the proportionality analysis and by invoking 
political process concerns (investors are not “represented”) not borne out by 
empirical analyses (i.e. Desbordes and Vauday 2007), this seems an unlikely 
outcome.32 
Arguing that investment arbitration’s embrace of proportionality is inevitable given 
the trend toward its “judicialization” (Stone Sweet and Grisel 2009), Stone Sweet 
complains that the few rulings that discuss the standard “exhibit a[n 
un]sophisticated understanding of proportionality analysis” and invoke it “timidly” 
(Stone Sweet 2009b, p. 68). The sequence of Argentina cases where the availability 
of the defence of necessity was in play, Stone Sweet argues, cried out for 
proportionality analysis. He prefers, therefore, the way in which the Continental 
Casualty tribunal engaged in this exercise by adopting what he calls a “mature form 
of proportionality analysis” (Stone Sweet 2009b, p. 74).33 Unlike the earlier 
Argentinian cases, in which arbitrators proceeded “with a heavy thumb pressed 
permanently down on the investor’s side of the scales in cases with very high 
political stakes,” the tribunal in Continental Casualty conferred some margin of 
appreciation to the state. It would “seem suicidal,” he concludes, for arbitrators to 
proceed in any other way (2009b, p. 75, 2009a).   
The future legitimacy of investment arbitration also motivates an important 
intervention by Kingsbury and Schill. Writing within the emerging paradigm of 
global administrative law, the authors aim to bring some of the “best practices” 
associated with administrative law to bear on international investment arbitration. 
They too conclude that arbitration tribunals may have “little choice” but to adopt 
proportionality analysis (Kingsbury and Schill 2009, p. 230). Proportionality has the 
advantage, they find, of being “open to different strands of political theory and 
different substantive preferences on investment protection” (Kingsbury and Schill 
2009, p. 275). By conscripting proportionality analysis into international investment 
law – and endorsing the way that the Tecmed tribunal went about doing this work34 
– tribunals will have adopted standards “congruent with an emerging set of public 
law principles for global regulatory governance,” thereby enhancing the regime’s 
legitimacy (Kingsbury and Schill 2009, p. 230): “Intense concerns about legitimacy 
in the system . . . should drive a rapid adoption of proportionality analysis as a 
standard technique” (Kingsbury and Schill 2009, p. 276). These authors make clear 
that the increasing embrace of proportionality analysis within investment tribunal 
decision making, though faulty and timid, represents perhaps the vanguard in 
investment arbitration’s response to ongoing legitimacy concerns. 
                                                 
32 Ibid. For a fuller discussion of these point, and an analysis of the Tecmed case more generally, see 
Schneiderman (2010b). 
33 Continental Casualty “is a rich piece of jurisprudence, far more sophisticated then the awards 
produced in the four previous cases” (Stone Sweet 2009b, p. 74). 
34 They point to the decision in Tecmed as “illustrat[ing] well the use of a proportionality analysis to 
manage tensions between investment protection and competing public policies” (2009, p. 33). 
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4.Conclusion 
This paper has tried to elucidate some of the ways in which arbitrators in 
investment disputes are attempting to reconcile the regime of investment 
disciplines with pressures emanating from outside the regime from both state and 
civil society actors.  I have suggested that a systems-theoretic understanding of 
international investment law suits well these actors’ self-understandings about how 
the regime operates – as normatively closed but cognitively open systems.  This 
heuristic generates some evidence of how both ongoing resistance and qualified 
openness to change operates within the regime’s internal structures. Arbitrators, I 
have argued, are acting reflexively to the extent that they are responding to these 
external critiques by shifting grounds, embracing WTO Appellate Board 
jurisprudence, and incorporating proportionality analysis. Researchers would be 
well advised to look for other accounts of this limited engagement with critique.  
I also have expressed doubt that the investment rules regime can be fully 
accounted for by a systems-theoretic approach. It is doubtful, for instance, that one 
can describe the regime as a fully autonomous sub-system functioning 
independently of the political system. Nor is it likely that the timid, ad hoc response 
I have described in this paper will be enough to sustain the regime going forward. 
The remaining question is whether states will tolerate the selective internalization 
of these pressures or whether they might intervene more directly. If states are the 
principal authors and subjects of this regime (Roberts 2010), the most effective 
means of limiting the regime’s external effects is by having states intervene 
directly. This, however, would be anathematic to functioning autopoietic systems, in 
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